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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to examine a possible
contingency measure of purchasing available ships on the
international market to augment existing sealift capabilities
prior to or during a crisis situation. This study explores
the already existing procurement process that the Military
Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration utilize to
acquire ships for the Ready Reserve Force. An in-depth set of
data was gathered of past ship sales on the worldwide market
from 1977 through 1989. The data are intended to explore
cyclical patterns, to possibly find explanations as to why
prices fluctuate, and to present a legitimate alternative in
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS
The less our forces are forward deployed, the more efficient
and effective our sealift and airlift must be to get these
forces back into action. [Ref. 1]
During a general war, more than 95 percent of all military
material needed to support our forces would have to be sent
by sea, through waters whose control would be contested by
a determined adversary; resources and manufactured goods
imported by sea would be vital to our defense and civilian
industries. A maritime shortfall would therefore mean a
shortfall across the spectrum in all segments of our economy
and military capability, including our ability to send
support to our allies. [Ref. 2]
Radical political changes are occurring throughout the
world faster than experts had ever imagined. Political
leaders in the U.S. are calling for the reduction of the
federal deficit through "peace dividends" while the president
of an unstable Soviet Union is consolidating his power. Also,
not so well defined is the Warsaw Pact. As this alignment
becomes unclear, the threat to Western Europe also begins to
become unclear. Drastic changes in Eastern Europe have
prompted the United States government to propose troop
withdrawals of its NATO forces so as to ensure the same from
the Russian government.
The problem arises in the event that these troops may be
needed in the future along with other reinforcements from the
U.S. In this situation, it becomes an added burden for the
U.S. to transport the original troops and equipment that were
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withdrawn plus the extra material needed than it does for the
Russians to redeploy their men and equipment. The need for
strategic sealift becomes even more of an important variable
than in the past.
The Third Report of the Commission on Merchant Marine and
Defense in 1988 stated a well-known fact to everyone in the
transportation industry: that early sealift capability, a
vital component of the U.S. defense strategy, has deterior-
ated. Senator Jeremiah A. Denton (chairman) insisted "that
without a strong and healthy maritime industry, the United
States cannot carry out its basic national security strategy
and that for whatever reason, our government continues to
follow a policy of permitting the on going atrophy." [Ref. 2]
In the last 20 years, our civilian fleet of ships capable
of ocean trade has plummeted from 843 in 1970 to 369 in 1990
and is forecasted to fall to only 220 in the next 10 years.
[Ref. 3] It should be noted that this declining trend is not
as bleak as those figures portray; total tonnage carrying
capacity has not followed this trend. From 1977 to 1984,
gross tonnage of the U.S. merchant fleet has actually grown
more than 20%. Between 1987 and 1989 the U.S. fleet expanded
by more than two million deadweight tons. [Ref. 4] The
shipping industry is based on competitive market principles:
operators are forced by economic necessity to maintain only
those vessels that are able to compete. This pressure results
in the purchase of fewer large ships that have the equivalent
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carrying capacity of numerous older vessels. This economy of
ship size saves the shipowner associated operating costs such
as fuel, labor and port fees. [Ref. 5] Unfortunately, this
practice has led to criticism. Because of the above-mentioned
design characteristics of present sealift (fewer but larger
ships), military planners may be placing precious war
materials in "too few baskets".
B. BACKGROUND
Present Defense Guidance mandates that United States
strategic mobility assets must continue to meet the
inter-theater and intra-theater requirements of a global
conventional war. [Ref. 2] These mobility assets include
airlift provided by the Military Airlift Command (MAC),
sealift provided by the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and
cargo handling facilities and personnel provided by the
Miliary Traffic Management Command (MTMC). Also included in
these assets are privately-owned U.S. and allied ships and
aircraft. More than 80% of the fuel, supplies and equipment
needed to support Marine amphibious forces alone will have to
be carried by civilian merchant ships. [Ref. 6] These
requirements are separate from and above requirements for the
resupply of U.S. Navy forces at sea.
During war, the strategic mobility assets are required to
transport material and supplies to and from areas of need
while resupply of naval vessels will be conducted by Combat
3
Logistic Forces (CLF) ships (assets controlled by the Navy to
meet its own requirements of readiness). The CLF presently
totals 59 ships, and, according to a 1988 Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) study, this number is possibly 34 ships less than
adequate to meet Navy resupply goals. [Ref. 7] The extra
ships needed to support the Navy will have to be taken from
the finite sealift assets available to MSC.
C. OBJECTIVES
Due to the decay of the U.S. maritime industry, MSC has
plans to purchase "new" ships for the RRF to augment current
assets in the maritime industry. Since MSC is able to
purchase ships built in foreign yards [Ref. 8], an in-depth
set of data was gathered of past ship sales on the worldwide
market from 1977 through 1989. [Ref. 9] The objective of
this thesis is to examine a possible contingency measure of
purchasing available ships on the international market to
augment existing sealift capabilities prior to or during a
crisis situation. This study explores the already-existing
procurement process that the Military Sealift Command and the
Maritime Administration utilize to acquire ships for the Ready
Reserve Force. The data are intended to explore cyclical
patterns, to possibly find explanations as to why prices
fluctuate and to present a legitimate alternative to augment
sealift by accelerated purchase of used ships.
4
D. SCOPE
The following chapter discusses present sealift
requirements, the responsibilities of the Military Sealift
Command and available assets that are to be used to perform
its mission. Chapter III provides an in-depth study of MARAD
and MSC's process of acquiring vessels for the RRF by looking
at the last Request For Proposal (RFP) solicitation N00033-86-
4011. Chapter IV will review the world resale market and look
at past trends in order to analyze the best times to purchase
sealift assets. Chapter V is a statistical model using
regression analysis to determine those variables that most
affect the resale values of ships. Chapter VI (Conclusion) is
a recommendation that the international market is a viable
alternative to acquire needed tonnage in time of emergency.
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II. PRESENT SEALIFT CAPABILITIES
A. SEALIFT AUGMENTATION
In a national emergency, merchant shipping will have to
augment U.S. Navy sealift. Because of the design characteris-
tics of present civilian merchant shipping, this industry has
the natural ability to operate effectively in the following
four roles during general mobilization [Ref. 10]:
1. Strategic Sealift: Deploy and resupply U.S. forces in
major military operations. Shipping will be required
for point-to-point movement to forward staging areas.
Additional ships may be used as floating storage
facilities in the theater of operations.
2. Mobile Logistic Support Aumentation: Supplement U.S.
Navy auxiliary ships in replenishing advance combatant
groups. Merchant shipping may be called upon for point-
to-point movement of supplies to forward bases, depot
replenishment of Naval underway replenishment ships,
either moored alongside or underway, and some limited
direct replenishment of combatant units.
3. Amphibious Operations: Transport sustaining logistics
supply as part of the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)
of an amphibious operation. AFOE shipping will offload
onto lighters and causeway ferries.
4. Support of the Civilian Economy: Move the commodities
and raw materials needed to maintain the nation's
economy and industrial base in wartime. It will be
necessary to maintain normal--or even higher--levels of
import and export trade, as well as transport of raw




The obvious situation that will require total mobilization
of all available assets and resources will be a NATO-Warsaw
Pact type conflict. It is this hostile scenario that will
place the greatest strain on our logistical supply lines.
The reinforcement of NATO is broken down into three
components, each with separate requirements. [Ref. 11)
1. U.S. and Canadian Military Forces
These forces will need reinforcements and resupply of
8.5 million tons of dry cargo and 15 million tons of
petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) within the first six
months of hostilities.
2. European NATO Military Forces
Require approximately 7.2 million tons of dry cargo
and 9.6 million tons of POL within the first six months.
3. NATO Economies
The NATO economies will require large amounts of raw
materials to maintain industrial production and civilian
consumption. Presently North America imports over 365 million
tons annually while Europe imports 945 million tons. Even if
a 70% delivery rate were reached, that would mean almost 76
million tons of cargo a month. [Ref. 11]
Figure 1 demonstrates the enormous amounts of raw
materials and finished products that will have to be
transported to maintain the NATO civilian economies in
comparison to that which is required for military use.
7
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Figure 1. NATO Requirements [Ref. 3]
In a European theater war the U.S. would control its
own shipping but would coordinate sealift needs and priorities
with its NATO allies. Now, fewer than 300 ships of the U.S.
merchant fleet, including ships of the RRF, are suitable for
the NATO reinforcement fleet. Conflicting needs could reduce
the number of ships available for U.S. use. [Ref. 12)
C. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
The world merchant fleet is composed of a large portion of
ships that are registered under what is termed flags of
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convenience (FOC). These ships take advantage of cheaper
registration requirements mandated by countries such as
Liberia, Panama, and Singapore.
Figure 2 demonstrates the large portion of vessels
that seek to profit from the less stringent conditions made
available by the FOC nations. The FOC vessels account for
27.5% of the total world fleet. NATO claims 20.6%, while the
Warsaw Pact accounts for 14.1% of the remaining vessels.
Japan and China have 5.4% and 5.2% respectively and the
remaining 27.2% are distributed to "other" nations. [Ref. 11]
MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD
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Figure 2. Control of Shipping (Ref. 3]
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D. THE EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROLLED FLEET (EUSC)
Many U.S. companies own ships that are registered under
foreign flags for the sake of economic advantage. The
Maritime Administration, with the Military Sealift Command, is
counting on a number of these foreign-flag ships in a national
emergency. Under the Merchant Marine Act, foreign-registered
ships owned by U.S. citizens are subject to requisitioning in
an emergency. Unfortunately, the outcome of calling up these
ships to help transport American supplies has never been
tested. [Ref. 12]
The EUSC fleet has a significant number of ships but
most of them are either tankers or gearless bulkers, both of
which are of limited utility for military sealift
augmentation but have substantial value to the economic
sustainability of our industrial base. Moreover, questions
have been raised about the wisdom of relying on the EUSC
fleet. The understandings between the U.S. and the various
flag-of-convenience countries are based on agreements, not
treaties, and are in effect during friendly relations only.
In past years, anti-U.S. feeling and waves of nationalism
have swept through Third World countries. Sympathy for U.S.
policies and goals is questionable. In addition, all these
ships are manned by foreign crews of mixed nationality, some
of whom may not be sympathetic to the United States or its
policies and might not sail for U.S. military support.
[Ref. 12]
E. PRIVATE SECTOR U.S. SHIPPING
Since 1979, the U.S. percentage of total liner trade
transported by American ships has dropped from 27.5% to 14.9%.
[Ref. 13] Numerous arguments have been presented for lack of
competitiveness in our merchant marine. U.S. ship owners
contend that purchasing and operating a U.S. flag vessel is
too expensive. Investors are also wary due to the poor
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returns on investment that this business offers. Many people
in this industry lay part of the blame on the once strong
maritime unions while others point at the stringent Coast
Guard requirements. On the ship construction side, U.S. built
ships cost millions more to produce stateside than abroad.
[Ref. 14]
Many maritime supporters have introduced programs such as
"Defense Readiness Contracts" in which to revitalize our
ailing maritime industry. Similar efforts have been proposed
by U.S. shipbuilders to bring back new types of Construction
Differential Subsidies (CDS) that would offer benefits to the
ship owner of a military useful ship, while at the same time
lobbying Congress to put pressure on foreign governments to
cease subsidies to their yards. This political gamesmanship
is a determined effort by U.S yards to establish a "fair
playing field" in which to compete. Unfortunately, ship
operators request alternate solutions to mend their
competitive problems in the international market. [Ref. 13]
In an attempt to unravel the dilemma that our merchant
marine is facing, lawmakers have unsuccessfully tried to
segregate the two sectors, that is, the ship operating
industry and the shipbuilding industry. Some enthusiasts have
urged Congress to eliminate the requirements that U.S. flag
vessels capable of Jones Act trade be U.S. built. This
legitimate proposal has much interest and support in the
operator's arena. Warren Leback, the Maritime Administrator,
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revealed a proposed plan in 1989 that would allow shipping
companies to purchase the cheaper foreign built hulls during
a "window of availability" similar to that of 1982. This is
a reasonable concept until confronted with the problem of the
U.S. shipyards. Since 1978, 55 shipyards have closed and more
than 60,000 workers have lost their jobs. [Ref. 15] Even
though the yards have not completed a commercial hull since
1987, they still maintain a strong lobby on Capitol Hill. The
Shipbuilder's Council of America has yet to let Congress
separate the maritime industry into ship operators and
shipbuilders. Until the shipping companies can detach
themselves from the stagnant U.S. commercial yards, it will
be extremely difficult to get any piece of legislation passed
allowing foreign built ships to participate in this market.
F. USTRANSCOM
In 1987, the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was
established. The Military Sealift Command (MSC), as well as
the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC), were designated as component
commands to USTRANSCOM. During peacetime, each of these
commands operate separately from each other and USTRANSCOM;
it is only in planning and time of war that they operate as a
completely coordinated unit. [Ref. 16]
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1. Military Sealift Command
The Military Sealift Command's primary mission is to
provide adequate numbers of ships to fleet support and special
missions in peacetime and strategic sealift in wartime. MSC's
responsibility is to transport material overseas that is
uneconomical to move by air; presently 95% of the dry cargo
and 99% of liquid cargo require this mode. [Ref. 17) MSC
maintains and operates a fleet of 371 ships. Some of these
ships are chartered from civilian companies and others are
owned by the government. [Ref. 6]
MSC realizes the danger of a declining merchant marine
as well as the peril of possible economic reprisals faced by
depending on foreign flag vessels to transport our import and
export materials. At present, the U.S. merchant marine
carries only about 4% of U.S. import and export ocean trade.
By reviewing MSC's future projections it is obvious, but not
stated, that MSC is willing to rely less and less on the
dwindling civilian fleet. The Ready Reserve Force is
programed to be increased to 142 ships by 1994. That is an
augment of 49 "new" ships in the next four years. [Ref. 6]
2. Ready Reserve Force
The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) consists of former
commercial ships purchased by the U.S. government and
maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) under a
memorandum of understanding between the Navy and the
Department of Transportation. MARAD was granted this custody
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because it was already in charge of maintaining the National
Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) and has the available assets to
maintain ships in a laid up condition. [Ref. 17] The RRF
ships are sustained in a five, ten, or 20-day readiness
posture and are located at ports on the Pacific, Atlantic and
Gulf Coasts. Each vessel has the requirement to be broken out
once every five years. They are to be manned by an available
pool of qualified civilian mariners. (Some serious doubts
exist that the manning resources will be sufficiently
available to operate these ships in time of emergency. The
majority of these ships are non-automated and steam powered,
requiring extensive manpower and experience that is no longer
readily available.) At the close of 1989, the RRF totaled 93
ships (83 cargo ships, nine tankers, and one troop ship) with
a goal of 142 ships by 1994. [Ref. 6]
3. Existing Assets
At present, our total maritime capability has fallen
to only 751 ships (Table 1), while at the same time
maintaining a relative stable world ranking of eighth in total
tonnage (Table II). In analysis, as U.S. private sector
shipping continues to decline, the U.S. government augments
its capabilities. Unfortunately, a major portion of U.S.
sealift is already controlled by governmental agencies.
No solution would be more beneficial to meet our
strategic sealift requirements than to have a strong and self-
sufficient U.S. maritime industry, but, at its present state,
14
TABLE I
AVAILABLE ASSETS (MSC, MARAD, CNA)





US COMMERCIAL .............. 369
TOTAL 751
TABLE II
PRINCIPAL MERCHANT FLEETS MARCH
1989 DWT (,000) [Ref. 4]
Liberia .............. 83,570 dwt
Panama ............... 66,879 dwt
Japan ................ 41,964 dwt
Greece ............... 36,526 dwt
Cyprus ............... 32,065 dwt
Norway ............... 23,506 dwt
USSR . . . ........ 21,844 dwt
USA. .......... 21,653 dwt
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the U.S. merchant marine is anything but strong and self-
sufficient. Until this situation is solved by the present or
future administration and industry leaders, our nation is
placing itself at risk by relying on decreasing U.S. and
allied assets. It is obvious that the Military Sealift
Command realizes this dilemma and has tried to augment its
present capabilities with the purchase of used vessels for its
Ready Reserve Force.
In time of national emergency and prior to a
resurgence of our maritime industry, it is a viable contention
that the United States government, through MSC and MARAD, can
acquire sealift assets on the international market. Table III
demonstrates that a vast quantity of ships exist; however,
these ships would probably not meet all the stringent USCG
requirements nor the specifications mandatory for MSC's RRF
ships, but they would provide the nation with a temporary
solution to the transportation of war materials. These ships,
the vast majority of which are diesel powered and of
relatively new construction (versus the ancient steam ships
that are currently maintained in the NDRF and, in some
instances, the RRF), would be less complicated to operate thus
making them easier to man.
16
TABLE III
EXISTING MERCHANT SHIPS [Ref. 4)











III. MSC/MARAD SHIP ACOUISITION PROCEDURES
The Denton Commission Report, while offering advice on how
to revive our sick maritime industry, unfortunately criticizes
MSC policy on many fronts. [Ref. 2] Two points directly
criticize the Military Sealift Command's acquisition process
for the RRF: (1) The Commission feels that even with the
increase of 49 ships in the RRF, MSC will still not be able to
fulfill the requirements necessary during a strategic sealift;
and (2) The bid process, required by federal regulations that
mandate the use of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), is causing
devastating damage to the entire industry.
A. COMPETITIVE PURCHASING
In obtaining sealift, MSC, by law, relies on full and
open competition, seeking the best value for the government at
the best price. Like the rest of the federal government, MSC
must acquire its assets by following the laws set up by
Congress and administered by the Executive branch. MSC and
MARAD feel that a strong U.S. merchant marine is the most
practical and least expensive way in which to accomplish its
mission of providing the nation with sealift capabilities. It
is the Military Sealift Command's objective to only purchase
18
those ships that are no longer considered to be of private
economic use.
To review the acquisition process of most items purchased
for the governmet, an acquisition plan is normally the
primary document drawn up by an appointed program manager.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances of MSC having to
procure material that has already been manufactured and that
is already in use by the civilian industry, MSC is exempt from
having to formulate an acquisition plan or strategy. What is
required, however, is for MSC to establish what type of
vessels it is seeking in the used ship market and then
[usually] to submit its request to MARAD. Once a requirement
is established, MARAD issues a request for proposals to ship
owners to bid their qualified ships for purchase by the
government. Once the RFP is received, the owner has a limited
amount of time to ensure that the vessel meets all require-
ments while at the same time determine a submission price that
accounts not only for the vessel itself but other criteria
such as necessary conversions or lay up procedures. The
purchase is accomplished under a negotiated contract if the
government feels that the offer was both responsive as well as
made by a responsible bidder. The government will then
negotiate the price to ensure all specifications can be met.
Both MSC and MARAD have the ability to purchase used ships
for the RRF, but the dissimilarity is that MSC sets up the
guidance and directs MARAD on what type of ships to purchase.
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MSC establishes the criteria, military utility and weights for
each type of ship that the Source Selection Evaluation Board
(SSEB) utilizes to determine those ships that will ultimately
be purchased. In FY 1990, funding for the RRF became the
responsibility of MARAD and $32.4 million were included in
their budget for fleet additions and acquisitions. Presently,
MSC has asked for $49.4 million for the addition of five ships
to the Ready Reserve Force in 1991. (Ref. 18]
B. OPPORTUNISTIC PURCHASES
Although it should be noted that MARAD cannot submit any
request for proposals without MSC instructions, MARAD usually
has no futuristic or long-range plan on what type of ships and
when these potential RRF ships are required. (Ref. 37] At
the same time MSC is restricted by the amounts of budgetary
resources available for the purchase of these ships. Because
of this process, MSC has the potential ability to take
advantage of unforseen world events in the civilian industry
so as to purchase ships it needs at the lowest cost. If a
long-range plan with milestones was to be required, MSC would
not be able to react quickly to new situations. For example,
at the moment MSC is keeping a close watch on the political
situation caused by the Exxon Valdez. Congress is debating
legislation which would require tankers in U.S. trade to be
constructed with double hulls. If this requirement was to
pass, then MSC could possibly purchase the then-obsolete
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single hull ships at bargain prices and place them in the RRF.
At present, MSC's RRF ships do not have to meet all civil-
sector requirements because their purpose is to stay in a
laid-up condition until an emergency. MSC also has the
ability to purchase certain types of foreign-built vessels due
to the fact that too few ships in the tanker, semi-submersible
heavy-lift, and RO/RO ship categories were ever built in the
U.S. to meet MSC requirements. [Ref. 8]
C. REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (REQUIREMENTS)
As of February 14, 1990, the Maritime Administration has
not acquired any vessels in the past two budget years. At
present, a new proposal is about to be sent out. The most
recent purchases were made through the Military Sealift
Command Contracting Division under solicitation number N00033-
86-4011. A detailed review of this request for proposal (RFP)
will demonstrate what is actually required prior to a ship
being purchased by the U.S. government.
An "Information To Offerors or Quoters" was sent out by
Military Sealift Command Code M-10-4 for unrestricted
procurement of "various vessels for the Ready Reserve Force."
The negotiated RFP highlighted that offerors were cautioned
that any procurement action resulting from a response to this
Request for Proposals is contingent upon the availability of
funds.
21
1. Priority of Purchases
The most recent Request for Proposal (RFP N00033-86-
4011) indicates that the Military Sealift Command is
interested in acquiring the following types of ships in order
of priority [Ref. 19]:
1. Tankers
2. Breakbulk ships (Fast)
3. Semi-submersible heavy lift
4. T-ACS (crane) candidate ships
5. Roll-on/roll-off ships.
2. Specific Reauirements
The following are specific requirements for each ship
type.
a. Tankers
1. Must have been built since 1965 (1986 RFP)
2. Deadweight tonnage between 20,000-100,000 DWT
3. Must have coated tanks for jet fuel
4. Must be able to transit Suez & Panama Canals
5. Maintain speed of 13.5 knots fully loaded
6. May be foreign built but must be U.S. documented at time
of sale
7. Must have range of 10,000 nm at 13.5 kts.
b. Breakbulk Ships "FAST"
1. Must have been built since 1965 (1986 RFP)
2. Must meet Suez and Panama Canal restrictions
3. Maintain speed of 20 kts
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4. Must have a minimum bale capacity of 400,000 cubic ft.
5. Must be of U.S. construction
6. Must have range of 10,000 nm at 20 kts.
c. Semi-submersible Heavy-lift Ships
1. Must have been built since 1965 (1986 RFP)
2. Must meet Suez and Panama Canal restrictions
3. Must be able to lift 1000 Lt. and carry 4 LCU's
4. Must maintain a speed of 12 kts
5. May be foreign built but documented U.S.
6. Must have a range of 10,000 nm at 8 kts.
d. T-ACS Candidate Ships
1. Must have been built or rebuilt since 1965
2. Length NLT 550 ft and NMT 825 ft loaded
3. 250 ft of continuous clean weather deck space
4. Breadth 73'-92', depth molded 40'-55'
5. Must be of U.S. Construction
6. Must maintain a speed of 17 kts for 10,000 nm.
e. Roll-on/Roll-off Ships
1. Must have been built since 1965
2. Must meet Suez and Panama Canal restrictions
3. Must be equipped with stern ramp
4. Must have 70,000 sq. ft. of below deck Roll-on/Roll-off
space
5. Must attain speeds of 17 kts for 10,000 nm when fully
loaded
6. May be foreign built but documented U.S.
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3. Evaluation and Award
a. Proposals
Proposals will be evaluated in descending order on
the basis of price, military utility and MSC program balance
in accordance with the following priorities:
1. Clean product tankers
2. Fast breakbulk ships
3. Semi-submersible heavy lift ships




Price evaluation is determined by calculating the
cost per unit lift of each ship type.
c. Military Utility
Military utility is evaluated separately for each
type of vessel. Performance criteria are established per
category of ship type and what may be considered of extreme
value in one class of vessel may not be evaluated in other
classes. The following factors are in descending order of
importance to show differences in grading criteria.
(1) Tanker.
1. Capability to carry more than two grades of petroleum
2. Cruising range at 13.5 knots








1. Bale cube excluding deep tanks
2. Maximum sustained speed fully laden
3. Main deck fore/aft fork lift access
4. Number of holds with tween decks




(3) Heavy Lift Ships.
i. Number of LCU's (Landing Craft Utility) that can be
carried
2. Maximum heavy lift capacity
3. Amount of deck area with minimum of 525 psf
4. Percent of deck area with capacity in excess of 525 psf
5. Number of modes of lift (RO/RO etc) in addition to
required semi-submersible mode
17. Single vs. multiple engines
18. Fuel type required.
Note: age is #10
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(4) T-ACS Candidate Ship.
1. Age
2. Length




10. Number of sister ships owned by U.S. government
11. Bow thruster.
(5) RO/RO Ships.
1. RO/RO sq ft capacity
2. Number and type of ramps
3. Below deck capacity in excess of minimum 70,000 sq ft
with 13 foot overhead at 525 psf
4. RO/RO capacity in excess of minimum (30,000 sq ft)
excluding that included in (3)
5. cruising range--fully loaded at 17 knots
19. Ramp vs. elevator lift
20. Fuel type.
Note: age is #10
As the RFP is answered by the various
bidders, MARAD determines if they meet the requirements
specified by the proposal. It is at this point that the ships
are evaluated by the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB).
Each of feror's proposal is evaluated within a ship priority
category on the basis of price and military utility. As
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mentioned in the RFP, the price is calculated as price per
unit lift. Awards will be made on this basis, as well as the
fact that the ship fits into the existing fleet and is within
funding constraints.
4. Inspection and Acceptance
Inspection is required and performed by the Commander,
Military Sealift Command, prior to any purchase based on
validation of the operational performance of the ship during
sea trials. This inspection includes propulsion systems
through food handling.
5. Delivery
MSC requires that all ships be delivered free on board
(FOB) to the delivery point within 180 days after award. The
various ports are given for each type of vessel. If changes
to delivery site are altered, a rate adjustment will be made.
Upon delivery, the ship will be jointly surveyed to ensure
that it is in compliance with conditions of agreement. Any
disputes will be judged by an American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) surveyor and shall be binding on both MSC and offeror.
Prior to delivery of the vessel the contractor shall:
1. Document the vessel under the U. S. Flag in accordance
with all USCG requirements.
2. Ensure that vessels shall meet USCG and American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS) standards and be in a class A-1
(highest) category.
3. Ensure that tankers who don't meet requirements
concerning segregated ballast are eligible for waiver.
4. Provide all technical drawings.
5. Ensure that no outstanding discrepancy reports exist.
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6. Ensure that the vessel is able to be fully operational
in all respects and capable of steaming continuously for
180 days.
7. Ensure that the vessel is in an environmentally accepta-
ble condition, i.e., no deteriorated asbestos.
8. Ensure that each ship is clean and in a well-preserved
condition
a) No rust or exposed equipment
b) The ship shall be free from vermin, insects and
rodents (clean)
9. Deactivate and prepare the vessel in accordance with
revised MARAD vessel deactivation procedures.
10. Arrange, supervise, and effect the recording of the Bill
of Sale.
11. Validate the operational performance of the ship(s) and
associated equipment in accordance with government's
report titled OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE SEA TRIALS. The
cost to repair any defect or correct any deficiency will
be included in the price of the contract.
12. Have on-board sufficient fuel oil and lube oil for five
days steaming at maximum sustained speed.
13. Ensure painting is per MSC instructions.
14. Ensure sufficient radio communication suit as outlined
per FCC rules, i.e., satellite communications, radars,
and other various radios.
15. Tow the vessel to the designated site, dehumidification
is required.
16. Ensure 100% of ships allowance list shall be on board,
stowed and documented.
17. Provide a list of items deemed part of vessel at
delivery, i.e., documents, certificates, unused fuel,
oil, unused stores, etc.
6. Special Contract Reguirements
The warranty requires only that the vessel(s)
delivered meet and comply with USCG, ABS, FCC, U.S. Public
Health Service, and International Convention of Safety of Life
at Sea requirements. The vessel must be free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances. The warranty also states that
cancellation, if deemed necessary because of major
deficiencies prior to delivery, will be at no cost to the
government. Repair work or conversion is to be accomplished
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only in U.S. shipyards. Vessels from communist areas are
ineligible for consideration.
7. Actual Purchase
The last RFP (N00033-86-4011) had five to six
responses in every category. The source selection authority
approved nine vessels with a total procurement of eight. The
ninth ship was determined by the offeror to still be of
commercial value and was placed back into service with no cost
to the government. The purchased ships were those that could
no longer can compete economically in the private sector;
active U.S. commercial ships are a cheaper form of sealift
capability than purchasing them outright. Some of the
responses to the proposal were made by foreign-built ship
owners, but they could not underbid the eight U.S.-built ships
that won the awards. [Ref. 20]
The ships shown in Table IV were purchased under RFP
(N00033-86-4011) and were placed in the RRF by early 1988.
The price paid for each vessel was considerably higher than
the market value during that time frame. This indicates that
there is a high cost associated with the complex requirements
that these vessels must meet to be placed into the RRF.
These successful offeror(s) under the direction of
Commander, Military Sealift Command, were instructed to
furnish the above vessels in tight, staunch, strong and well
and sufficiently tackled, furnished and equipped. The vessel,
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TABLE IV
PURCHASED SHIPS [Ref. 20]
NAME OF VESSEL PRICE SOLD
S.S. SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (TANKER) 9.0 million
S.S. FALCON LADY (TANKER) 10.7 million
S.S. RAPID (RO/RO) 8.5 million
S.S. TYSON LYKES (RO/RO) 15.0 million
S.S. PRESIDENT JACKSON (CARGO) 7.5 million
S.S. PRESIDENT ADAMS (CARGO) 7.5 million
S.S. FEDNAV EXPRESS (RO/RO) 14.5 million
S.S. FEDNAV SEAWAYS (RO/RO) 14.5 million
in every respect, will be seaworthy, in good running condition
and repair and in all respect fit for service.
D. OTHER POSSIBILITIES
Until the U.S. maritime industry is able to meet all
requirements on its own, the purchase of sealift is not the
only method in which the U.S. must depend upon to transport
needed materials. Many other options are available to meet
these requirements, two of which include chartering and
political acquisition.
1. Charter Market
In the commercial sphere, many shippers or shipping
companies often prefer to acquire their shipping assets
through the charter market versus buying the assets. This
option enables the would-be shipowner to have the use of a
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vessel but not the economic risk of such an investment,
freeing up capital for other purposes. This charter market
exists primarily to take advantage of this type of shipper
demand. The vessel types most commonly chartered are tankers
and bulker ships. Professional shipowners will purchase these
vessels with the specific intent to cater to this demand by
either subcontracting by volume of cargo for a fixed fee per
ton or by renting the entire ship out for a specified period
of time. The Military Sealift Command operates many of its
existing assets in this manner.
2. Political Acauisition
During the Iran/Iraq war, the U.S. government utilized
a system of reflagging Kuwait tankers to U.S. registry that
called on ports in the Persian Gulf. To establish credibili-
ty, a company office was opened in the U.S. as well as
replacing key licensed personnel on the ship. This process
was for politically different reasons than the acquisition of
sealift but can also be used as another alternative in adding
sealift to aid in an emergency.
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IV. THE FLUCTUATING WORLD RESALE MARKET
A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter is a study of fluctuating merchant ship
prices in the international market. Its purpose is to explain
past trends in the bulker, cargo and tanker used ship sales.
The data gathered to perform this study were taken from
Fairplay Weekly [Ref. 9], a periodical which lists ships sold,
ship characteristics and price sold. The data were listed in
alphabetical order and it was in this order that the data were
accumulated. Five ships of the three separate ship types were
chosen randomly at the beginning of each quarter of each year,
generating a total of 20 vessels per type per year. The ships
had to meet two criteria: they could be no more than 20 years
of age and must exceed 1000 gross registered tons (GRT). The
data were accumulated from 1977 to 1989 generating a data base
of 260 ships of each type.
A total price paid and a total tonnage was calculated for
each class of ship for each year. By dividing the total price
paid by the total tonnage, the price per ton for that year is
calculated. The price per ton and the average age at sale
date were then consolidated in Table V and graphed to show the
cyclical patterns that this market experienced. The purpose






YR AVG PRICE/ AVG PRICE/ AVG PRICE/
SOLD AGE TON AGE TON AGE TON
77 9.75 329 8.95 490 7.9 64
78 9.65 149 13.15 197 9 59
79 8.7 353 12.9 273 10.2 108
80 9.8 507 9.85 526 8.75 160
81 11.35 412 13.55 417 12.45 49
82 11.8 195 12.35 266 10.15 41
83 11.8 143 9.95 285 10.05 26
84 12.8 155 10.5 276 10.5 38
85 11 130 11.35 147 9.85 54
86 10.1 96 11.55 127 12.1 33
87 12.6 114 11 218 12.6 79
8 12.9 242 13.4 334 12.5 98
89 13.8 345 14 510 11.65 239
B. PARAMETER DEFINITIONS
1. Gross ReQistered Ton (GRT)
GRT is a volume measure of the total enclosed space of
the ship (with certain space exemptions for those spaces
utilized in operating the ship) in tons of 100 cubic feet
each. (Ref. 21]
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2. Deadweight Tonnnaae (DWT)
DWT is the measure of weight that a ship is permitted
to carry. DWT indicates the maximum weight of cargo, fuel,
stores and potable water. [Ref. 21)
C. SHIP TYPES AND USES
1. Bulker
The dry bulk carrier is a ship that is designed with
hatches and without tween decks. These ships are either
geared (self-loading and unloading equipment) or gearless,
with the majority being the latter. They are intended to
carry a single commodity during a voyage but are built to take
advantage of a variety of types of cargo. The major
commodities that are carried by these ships are ore, coal and
grain. Most of these ships are built in the 15,000-30,000 grt
range with speeds averaging 14-15 knots. [Ref. 22] As
described previously, the bulker was not a vessel that the
Military Sealift Command was looking for in its present RFP.
In time of national emergency, this type of ship will be
required to carry the necessary raw materials to the U.S. and
our allies for the production of finished products.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has the fewest of these types of
vessels. (Ref. 10) It should also be mentioned that many
bulkers are equipped to carry ore, bulk or oil. These ships
are called O/B/O's and are of military useful design. [Ref.
10] It is possibly misleading that this study grouped the
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many types of bulkers together, but it is beyond the scope of
this study to break out the various subcategories in each
type.
2. Cargo Ship (Breakbulk)
The cargo ship, also called a freighter, is a flexible
vessel built with the intent of carrying an abundance of types
of cargoes ranging from bulk grain to military vehicles. It
differs from specialty-type cargo ships such as the container
ship in the sense that it is built to handle all sorts of
cargo. The general cargo ship is usually a sturdily-built ship
that encompasses many holds, each with numerous tween decks
that allow the maximum amount of cargo to be placed within
each hatch or hold and not having to be stowed on top of other
cargo. The breakbulk ship is equipped with its own cargo
handling gear in the form of booms or cranes. The cargo is
usually loaded by stevedores working the ship's gear by means
of slings or cargo nets. This self-supporting method of cargo
transfer enables the ship to call on ports without having to
rely on shore-based equipment making the ship militarily
useful in conflict areas involving lesser developed countries.
The average general cargo ship normally operates at speeds of
15 knots; however, many are capable of attaining marginally
higher speeds. [Ref. 23]
In recent years, the labor-intensive breakbulk ship
has seen its market share in the liner trade overshadowed by
the fast and highly efficient container fleets now utilized to
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transport most general cargo. [Ref. 5] In response to this
competition, breakbulk ships have had to adapt to the changing
market and more and more ships have been built along a
multipurpose role. The multipurpose ships are able to load a
limited amount of containers efficiently while still being
able to perform in the classic breakbulk environment.
3. Tanker
The tanker is a vessel designed to carry liquid
products in bulk form. These ships are built with numerous
storage tanks and intricate piping systems that enable the
ship's crew to pump the cargo ashore or transfer it to various
holds via high capacity pumps. The basic tanker carries crude
oil or its derivatives: gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene and
jet fuel. It should be noted that the type of cargo the
tanker carries usually specifies the ship's design. In the
crude oil trade, Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) ships in the
150,000 DWT and over range, transport oil to refineries.
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) carriers are specially built to
transport natural gas at extremely low temperatures. The
tanker that is deemed most valuable in the military context is
that of the "handy size" of between 6000 and 35,000 DWT. This
vessel is designed to carry refined or clean products thus
making it suitable for transporting military fuels. [Ref. 24]
4. Semi-Submersible Heavy-Lift
The semi-submersible heavy-lift ship was originally
designed to transport weights (usually loads of 100 tons or
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more) that the liner industry could not. Heavy-lift ships are
designed to onload their cargo by either the use of Stulken
cranes or by partial submersion of the vessel itself while the
cargo is floated on. [Ref. 5]
5. Roll-On/Roll-Off
The Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) is a cargo vessel
designed to utilize a built-in ramp to load and discharge
cargo. This concept of ship was developed in the late 1920's
in the U.S. to transport freight cars and wheeled vehicles.
The vast majority of general cargo is carried by container-
ship. However, due to the containership's specialization, not
all cargo can be transported by this service. What the RO/RO
gives up in wasted cargo space it gains in flexibility. The
RO/RO's configuration is specially suited for carrying any
wheeled vehicle or any commodity that is too bulky to fit in
a container but can be maneuvered by a forklift. Many RO/RO
ships are built with some container-carrying capacity but, at
the same time, their cargo decks are adjustable to allow for
maximum stowage or the capability to carry oversized wheeled
vehicles. The RO/RO's main advantage over the general
breakbulk ship is that it is able to call on the same ports,
and, at the same time, load and unload at quicker rates.
Regarding military utility, the RO/RO is a perfect mode of
transport for military tanks, armored personnel carriers,
trucks, etc. [Ref. 5)
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D. EFFECTS ON SHIP PRICES
Secondhand ship prices are affected by new building prices
and by freight rates. [Ref. 25] Both new building costs and
freight rates are affected by industrialized nations' economic
states.
Much of the economic growth in the postwar period has been
the result of international trade. Recent studies have
demonstrated that when the economies of OECD countries grow by
more than 1.5% to 2% per year, non-oil imports grow at a
slightly higher rate. The inverse is true for zero growth
years resulting in approximately a 5% drop in non-oil imports.
[Ref. 12] As national economies fluctuate, so, too, do the
commodities that are traded on the international market. In
this sense the shipping industry closely follows economic
activity.
The shipping industry is a service-oriented business. Its
"product" is to transport goods to destinations where they are
needed. Like all products that are offered in a market
environment, they are exchanged according to the rules of
supply and demand. Demand, Q(D), may be defined as being that
quantity of service needed to move world seaborne trade. This
is determined by freight rates. The supply side of the market
for shipping services is given by the amount of tonnage
available, Q(S), including ships in lay up, and is determined
by freight rates and fuel costs. At equilibrium, Q(D) = Q(S),
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maintaining an efficient use of assets by both shippers and
ship owners. [Ref. 26)
Any change in world trade patterns, freight rates or fuel
cost will shift the equilibrium. For example, if fuel costs
rise proportionately to the freight rates then potential
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Figure 3. Cargo Freight Indices [Refs. 21,28)
Figure 3 demonstrates the change that occurred in freight
rates during the time period under examination and can be
matched to the change that occurred in the second-hand price
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of cargo ships shown in Figure 4. It is easily determined
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Figure 4. Cargo Ship
When available tonnage increases without a proportional
increase in seaborne trade, then a situation of over-supply
exists which forces freight rates down which in turn increases
ships sold for scrap and decreases new ship construction
orders.
In 1977, a 10% increase in growth of OECD industrial
output from 1976 resulted in world seaborne trade increase by
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approximately 8% leading to the relatively high price of used
ships during that time period. [Ref. 12]
By comparing the number of ships that were sent to scrap,
a similar explanation can be used. During the extremely
depressed ship market of 1982-1986 which was characterized by
severely low freight rates brought about by a world economic
recession [Refs. 27,28], it was seen that the supply of
available tonnage outweighed the demand for shipping services.
This over-supply caused low resale values on ships plus high
scrap rates. In 1980 only 140 tankers were scrapped compared
to 277 in 1985. In the bulker market 20 ships were scrapped
in 1980 compared to 385 in 1986. The number of cargo ships
scrapped in 1980 was 562 and increased to a high in 1985 of
1063 ships. [Refs. 21,28]
An overtonnage situation for large tankers will exist in
the near future if present orders for new VLCC's continue to
be placed at the current rate. The number of these large
ships totaled 408 at the end of 1988, accounting for 113
million DWT. As of 1989, 20 new ships were launched from
shipyards, and, as of March 1990, 67 (22 million DWT) are
scheduled to be built with the majority being delivered in
1992. In contrast, only five million DWTs are expected to be
scrapped by that time. By 1992 the world VLCC fleet is
projected to grow to 130 million DWT without any substantial
increase in demand for the transport of crude oil. [Ref. 29]
41
When the accumulated data were graphed and compared to
significant economic indicators such as U.S. long-term
interest rates (Figure 5) and specific cargo freight indices
(Figure 6), it becomes obvious that as the economy slumps, the









77 7; 719 BID el e2 83 84 8 8 87 N8 0
YWA
-INTEWS PATE








77 70 79 80 81 2 83 64 05 86 67 W 69
Y9AR GOLO
BUJLKER + cumO 0 9 N
Figure 6. Price Comparison
In analysis of Figures 5 and 6, the data matched this
hypothesis until 1986 when interest rates, freight rates and
resale cost per ton all increased. After 1986, two major
"outside" influences affected the market as can be seen from
Figures 7-9. The first is the undercapacity of foreign
shipyards to keep up with the demand of new construction
orders. As of March 1990, Japanese shipyards have a backlog
of 275 vessels waiting to be built. This unexpectedly high
demand for new tonnage has caused an increase in demand for
existing tonnage. This new demand has driven up prices, and,
at the same time, shipowners have retained ships that would
normally be considered not economically competitive.
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PRODUCTS TANKER 30,000 DWT (BUILT FAR EAST YARD)
Figure 7. Tankers [Ref. 41
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BULK CARRIER 60,000 DWT (BUILT FAR EAST YARD)
Figure 8. Bulker (Ref. 4]
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Figure 9. Cargo Ships [Ref. 4]
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The second "outside" influence is considered somewhat of
an anomaly; the rapid escalation in prices for "used" ships
has created a speculative market environment. Because present
new construction costs, used bulker prices and used tanker
prices are extremely high (Figures 7 and 8), ship buyers are
spending enormous amounts of money (Table IV) on used ships
hoping that conditions in the economy remain constant and the
demand for new ship construction surpasses present shipyard
capability. [Ref. 30]
By observation of accumulated data, the shipping industry
operates in a cyclical environment. Once the construction
boom catches up with the present demand or the demand for
shipping services themselves diminish, prices for existing




If resources were made available to MSC or MARAD to
acquire "new" assets, when would be the right time to buy?
Ship resale values fluctuate often, so it is to the
prospective buyer's benefit to know the most economical time
to buy. In commercial applications the time to buy would be
defined as a point during a relatively low cost situation
prior to an upswing in the world economy. From a governmental
standpoint, the approach would be to purchase at the lowest
point possible.
By establishing and quantifying relationships and
dependencies between variables, it is possible to predict or
estimate the desired variable (ship price) based on a known or
predicted value of one or more related values. The variables
whose value one is trying to determine is called the dependent
variable. The variables which "cause" the values of the
dependent variable are called independent variables. [Ref.
31]
In linear regression the dependent variable is referred to
as Y, and the independent variables are referred to as X. By
performing the regression analysis it is possible to find the
constants and correlating factors that define the relationship
between the variables. Linear regression will also provide
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the means to measure the strength and validity of a
relationship among variables. [Ref. 31]
Excluding all direct politically-induced influences on
ship resale values, six variables were chosen to forecast
future trends in this market. These variables were
accumulated for each separate type of vessel during the year
that it was sold. Using the 760 ships that were sampled to
describe trends, new data (freight rates, total fleet size,
fleet age, and trade volume) were accumulated and compared in
order to demonstrate if they would have any substantial effect
on predicting prices.
These variables were then, via a regression equation, used
to determine the "best" indicators or fit for a predictor
model.
The following equation vas used:
Y = b0 + bIX , + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + bX 5 + b6 X6
where:
Y = Ship price
X,= Ship size (DWT)
X2 = Ship age at time of sale
X 3 = Average freight rate
X 4 = Total fleet size
X 5 = Fleet age
49
= Trade volume
b= Coefficients to be determined.
B. DATA
The data that were utilized to form the dependent and
independent variables were taken from numerous sources. The
individual tonnage, age, and ship prices were accumulated from
the "Sales and Purchase" section of the weekly international
shipping periodical Fairplay. These data were accumulated
randomly by selecting 20 ships a year in the bulker, cargo,
and tanker markets from 1977 to 1989 for a total of 260 ships
in each type. The tonnage measurements for the regression
model were measured in DWT to maintain consistency across ship
types.
The remaining independent data were taken from yearly OECD
Maritime Transport reports. The freight rates, total fleet
size, trade volume, and fleet age were all accumulated for
each separate type and year of ship. The freight rates were
derived from indices that indicate prices shippers paid to
move cargo by ocean transport. Total fleet size is a
worldwide accumulation of existing ships by deadweight tonnage
consisting of those in operational and laid-up status for each
ship type. Trade volume moved is the amount of recorded OECD
cargo transported in a given year for each ship type. Fleet
age is an average age of existing ships in a given year for
each class; vessels older than 30 years in age were considered
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as "aged" 35 years. The data for freight rates and trade
volume for cargo ships and bulkers were the same in each year
due to both being classified as dry cargo.
C. RESULTS
1. R-sauared
The R-squared measure is the degree to which the
equation fits the prediction model. The closer R-squared is
to one, the better the model, or in other words,
(1 - R-squared) is the "unexplained" variation of the actual
Y values from the values estimated by the regression equation.
[Ref. 32] By regressing all independent variables together it
is possible to establish a fairly accurate prediction of
future ship prices.
Table VI illustrates the accuracy of the model when
utilizing the various portions of the equation. The R-squared
values of .703, .600 and .536 are given when all variables are
employed for each of the individual ships, with the bulker
having the best fit. However, it is also easily established
that individual variables regressed alone on ship prices are
inadequate and using only a portion of the full equation




REGRESSOR VARIABLES R SQUARED
VAPIABLES BULKER CARGO TANKER
ALL VARIABLES 0.703 0.600 0.536
ALL LESS VOLUME 0.697 0.585 0.495
DWT AND AGE 0.388 0.309 0.303
SHIP SIZE 0.151 0.069 0.026
AGE 0.219 0.237 0.303
FREIGHT RATE 0.180 0.058 0.054
FLEET SIZE 0.063 0.026 0.006
FLEET AGE 0.013 0.014 0.001
TRADE VOLUME 0.000 0.037 0.075
The resale prices for all three types of ships responded
highest to the variables of; DWT of the individual ships,
freight rates and fleet size. However, in contrast to the
tanker and cargo ship second hand prices, the bulker prices
did not respond to the amount of tonnage moved by bulkers and
had little to no bearing on what the ships sold for.
The cargo ships and tankers demonstrated a reaction in the
area of age of the individual ship being sold. Total fleet
size was not as much of a controlling factor compared to total
tonnage moved for the tanker market. Also, size of the
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individual cargo ship or tanker made only a moderate
contribution to the fit of the overall equation.
2. Coefficients
Tables VII and VIII provide the coefficients and the
standard errors of the coefficients for nine separate
possibilities of the model. The negative coefficient signs
for age (b2) and fleet size (b5) logically indicate that as
individual ship increased in age, its relative worth
decreased, and, as more tonnage (b,) became available, the
demand for ships would decrease. It was interesting to note
that in several areas this expectation was found to be
incorrect.
3. T-statistic
To test to see if the variable truly added any benefit
to the prediction model, a test is used to verify: (1) that
the relationship between each independent variable and the
dependent variable is logical; and (2) each independent
variable coefficient is statistically different from zero.
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TABLE VII
COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS
OF THE COEFFICIENTS (TANKER)
TNKERS caEFrICIENTS ME UPPER NUMBERS
9TAr IMD EROR OF THE COE. M THE LOER NUNERU
OWT ME RATE FLET FLEET 1WDE
bt b2 b3 SIZE b4 AGE b5 VOL. b6
ALL 0.000006 -0.777430 -0.053420 0.017095 2.761721 0.015978
0.000002 0.061066 0.0383 0.015844 0.99413 0.004052
ALL - 0.000007 -0.762260 0.103254 0.0491"9 3.306743
VOLUME 0.000002 0.961924 0.017112 0.014106 0.574137














To test whether the coefficient of each independent
variable is significantly different than zero, a hypothesis
of the opposite is used (that each is not significantly
different from zero, the null hypothesis, Ho: true value of
b, = 0). A t-statistic is utilized to test the hypothesis
that the true population coefficient is zero and the sample
coefficient is different only due to sampling error. The t-
statistic is found by dividing the variable coefficient by
its standard error. [Ref. 32]
For example, the tanker t-statistic for DWT in the
full model = .000006/.000002 = 3. This indicates that if the
true population coefficient was really zero, the result would
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be three standard deviations from zero, and the probability of
this occurring is almost zero. The hypothesis is rejected and
the sample coefficient is accepted. A general rule is: If
the absolute value of each t-statistic is two or greater, the
null hypothesis is rejected and the sample coefficient is
accepted. [Ref. 32)
The ultimate objective of the t-statistic is to obtain
the best set of coefficients (variables) to use in the
prediction model. Tables VII and VIII reveal that the values
of coefficients change as the equation is changed. When the
general rule is applied to Table VII for the full model, the
variable b3 (rate) does not meet the necessary criterion;
however, if b3 is taken out of the full model, R-squared lowers
from .536 to .532, indicating that the variable b3 does add
slightly to the overall R-squared value. This can be
attributed to a possible correlation between freight rates and
trade volume moved. In analysis of the results from Table VI
(R-squared) and Tables VII and VIII (Coefficients), it is seen
that a fairly accurate prediction model of second-hand ship
values is possible when utilizing all six variables. However,
as more variables are withdrawn from the equation, the
prediction value is diminished.
One problem that exists with this analysis of the data
is the data itself. By grouping all the bulkers, general
cargo, and tankers together, the data failed to take into
account that the price of a ship in a specific category will
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TABLE VIII
COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS
OF THE COEFFICIENTS (BULKER)
BULKER COEFFICIENTS ARE UPPER NUMBERS
STANDARD ERROR OF THE COEF. ARE THE LOWER NUMBERS
DWT AGE RATE FLEET FLEET -TRADE
bI b2 b3 SIZE b4 AGE b5 VOL. b6
ALL 0.000051 -0.499220 0.048885 -0.190180 1.835900 0.010016
0.000005 0.038707 0.018907 0.038360 0.614911 0.005003
ALL - 0.000054 -0.489930 0.083450 -0.117330 1.490255
VOLUME 0.000004 0.037302 0.008909 0.020452 0.563225














differ tremendously by the type of cargo handling equipment
that is installed. A geared bulker is going to bring a higher
price than one without gear or an O\B\O bulker versus a simple
dry bulker. This is also true in the tanker and cargo ships;
the data did not differentiate reefer capable cargo ships or
chemical tankers from the generic ship design. Another
discrepancy that was not taken into account was the actual
condition of the ships themselves at the time of sale..
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Obviously, a well-maintained ship is going to bring a higher
price than a ship that is ready for scrap.
By utilizing the six variables, however, it is still
possible to establish an equation that will deliver an
adequate prediction model. Unfortunately, to use such a model
necessitates that the potential purchaser must have or be able




COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS
OF THE COEFFICIENTS (CARGO)
COEFFICIENTS ARE UPPER NUMBERS
STANDARD ERROR OF THE COEF. ARE THE LOWER NUMBERS
DWT AGE RATE FLEET FLEET -TRADE
bl b2 b3 SIZE b4 AGE b5 VOL. b6
ALL 0.000070 -0.256610 0.042271 -0.014300 -0.094640 -0.005350
0.000012 0.018784 0.004706 0.030408 0.553191 0.001974
ALL - 0.000075 -0.253770 0.038233 -0.093310 1.111918
VOLUME 0.000012 0.018464 0.004058 0.010775 0.345234
















Due to the United States' inability to revitalize the
maritime industry to a point that meets the defense
requirements, alternative solutions should be investigated.
One viable option would be to purchase these assets on the
"used" international market during or prior to a national
emergency. Because the U.S. government already has an
acquisition system in force to purchase used ships in this
arena, the same process can be utilized to acquire emergency
sealift at an accelerated pace.
An analysis of accumulated data of used ship prices
reveals a direct correlation to individual ship size,
individual age, freight rates, fleet size, fleet age, and
tonnage moved. Other factors that directly affect these
prices are the present economic prosperity of the world and
the cost of new construction.
It can also be concluded that ship operators see a vessel
as a considerable capital investment and to borrow large
amounts of money for new ship construction during times of
high interest rates is not seen as a financially sound
business strategy when cheaper "used" sources of transporta-
tion are available. By comparing leading industrial nations'
long-term interest rates to used ship prices it was found that
initially, as interest prices rose, so, too, did the resale
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values for ships. The downturn in the world economy and the
relative rise in new construction prices initially accounts
for owner's decisions to purchase the cheaper used ships. As
economic hardship continues, prospective buyers purchase
neither new or used ships, thus demonstrating periods of low
resale values.
The demand for used ships also reflects future expecta-
tions of ship prices. As new building prices accelerate,
combined with reduced shipbuilding capacity, present and
future owners purchase ships in a speculative manner. If new
construction cost are forecasted to be high, present prices of
tonnage in the used market will remain high.
Effects that are not economic and cannot be forecasted
always exist. When the Suez Canal was closed, a major portion
of the world's oil had to be transported longer distances
mandating the need for extra tonnage in the tanker trade.
This type of political pressure on market values makes it
difficult to forecast the best time to purchase used ships.
In the event of a major conflict, it is certain that the cost
to purchase existing tonnage would be expensive. However, if
the U.S. Government purchased the necessary tonnage it
required in the international market during periods of low
economic growth, the savings could be many times what it might
be during peak periods.
This solution of acquiring strategic sealift on the
international market is not the best one and can only be
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considered temporary. However, until the U.S. commercial
maritime industry is revitalized, the acquisition of used





Regression Output: ON ALL VARIABLES
Constant 2.015809
Std Err of Y Est 2.455519
R Squared 0.703863
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 213
X Coefficient(s) 0.000051 -0.49922 0.048885 -0.18018
1.835900 0.010016
Std Err of Coef. 0.000005 0.038707 0.018907 0.038360
0.614911 0.005003
Regression Output: MINUS TONNAGE MOVED
Constant 4.259520
Std Err of Y Est 2.432929
R Squared 0.696760
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 234
X Coefficient(s) 0.000054 -0.48993 0.083450 -0.11733
1.490255
Std Err of Coef. 0.000004 0.037302 0.008909 0.020452
0.563225
Regression Output: DWT AND AGE AT SALE ONLY
Constant 8.868983
Std Err of Y Est 3.523346
R Squared 0.388132
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 257
X Coefficient(s) 0.000051 -0.49058
Std Err of Coef. 0.000006 0.049131
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Regression Output: AGE AT TIME OF SALE ONLY
Constant 10.99594
Std Err of Y Est 3.973774
R Squared 0.218660
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) -0.47028
Std Err of Coef. 0.055345
Regression Output: DWT ONLY
Constant 3.535390
Std Err of Y Est 4.142853
R Squared 0.150755
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) 0.000048
Std Err of Coef. 0.000007
Regression Output: FREIGHT INDICES THRU 1988
Constant -8.94596
Std Err of Y Est 3.968178
R Squared 0.179514
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) 0.084256
Std Err of Coef. 0.011676
Regression Output: TOTAL FLEET SIZE THRU 1988
Constant 16.25449
Std Err of Y Est 4.240104
R Squared 0.063211
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) -0.05096
Std Err of Coef. 0.012718
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Regression Output: FLEET AGE THRU 1988
Constant 11.16766
Std Err of Y Est 4.353164
R Squared 0.012587
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) -0.57961
Std Err of Coef. 0.332765
Regression Output: TONNAGE MOVED THRU 1987
Constant 5.363060
Std Err of Y Est 4.460249
R Squared 0.000000
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 218
X Coefficient(s) 0.000028
Std Err of Coef. 0.002173
CARGO SHIPS
Regression Output: ALL VARIABLES, THRU 1987
Constant 10.61677
Std Err of Y Est 1.180200
R Squared 0.600339
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 213
X Coefficient(s) 0.000070 -0.25661 0.042271 -0.01430
-0.09464 -0.00535
Std Err of Coef. 0.000012 0.018784 0.004706 0.030408
0.553191 0.001974
Regression Output: ALL MINUS TONNAGE MOVED,
THRU 1988
Constant -2.56995
Std Err of Y Est 1.197264
R Squared 0.584852
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 234
X Coefficient(s) 0.000075 -0.25377 0.038233 -0.09331
1.111918
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Std Err of Coef. 0.000012 0.018464 0.004058 0.010775
0.345234
Regression Output: AGE AND DWT ONLY ,THRU 1989
Constant 4.318146
Std Err of Y Est 1.677150
R Squared 0.308610
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 257
X Coefficient(s) 0.000088 -0.23538
Std Err of Coef. 0.000017 0.024937
Regression Output: AGE ONLY, THRU 1989
Constant 5.514870
Std Err of Y Est 1.758857
R Squared 0.236645
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) -0.23387
Std Err of Coef. 0.026150
Regression Output: DWT ONLY
Constant 1.588336
Std Err of Y Est 1.942487
R Squared 0.068931
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) 0.000086
Std Err of Coef. 0.000019
Regression Output: FREIGHT RATE
Constant 
-0.86632
Std Err of Y Est 1.787964
R Squared 0.058322
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) 0.020198
Std Err of Coef. 0.005261
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Regression Output: TOTAL FLEET SIZE
Constant 8.021674
Std Err of Y Est 1.818681
R Squared 0.025688
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) -0.03386
Std Err of Coef. 0.013517
Regression Output: TONNAGE MOVED
Constant 7.141003
Std Err of Y Est 1.810914
R Squared 0.036942
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 218
X Coefficient(s) -0.00255
Std Err of Coef. 0.000882
Regression Output: AVG FLEET AGE
Constant -9.92266
Std Err of Y Est 1.829352
R Squared 0.014221
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) 0.900091
Std Err of Coef. 0.485745
TANKERS
Regression Output: ALL VARIABLES THRU 1987
Constant -43.5931
Std Err of Y Est 3.941995
R Squared 0.535732
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 213
X Coefficient(s) 0.000006 -0.77743 -0.05342 0.017095
2.761721 0.015978
Std Err of Coef. 0.000002 0.061066 0.038683 0.015844
0.594138 0.004052
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Std Err of Y Est 4.100373
R Squared 0.494996
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 234
X Coefficient(s) 0.000007 -0.76226 0.103254 0.049199
3.306743
Std Err of Coef. 0.000002 0.061934 0.017112 0.014186
0.574137
Regression Output: AGE AND DWT ONLY, THRU 1989
Constant 15.75623
Std Err of Y Est 5.095678
R Squared 0.303367
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 257
X Coefficient(s) 0.000001 -0.72643
Std Err of Coef. 0.000003 0.071874
Regression Output: AGE ONLY, THRU 1989
Constant 15.94190
Std Err of Y Est 5.086749
R Squared 0.303105
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) 
-0.73240
Std Err of Coef. 0.069140
Regression Output: DWT ONLY
Constant 6.998078
Std Err of Y Est 6.012173
R Squared 0.026469
No. of Observations 260
Degrees of Freedom 258
X Coefficient(s) 0.000009
Std Err of Coef. 0.000003
67
Regression Output: FREIGHT RATE ONLY
Constant 3.049198
Std Err of Y Est 5.565018
R Squared 0.053889
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) 0.074464
Std Err of Coef. 0.020224
Regression Output: TOTAL FLEET SIZE
Constant 4.044751
Std Err of Y Est 5.703144
R Squared 0.006340
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) 0.011822
Std Err of Coef. 0.009593
Regression Output: AVG FLEET AGE
Constant 9.058726
Std Err of Y Est 5.719718
R Squared 0.000556
No. of Observations 240
Degrees of Freedom 238
X Coefficient(s) -0.13491
Std Err of Coef. 0.370494
Regression Output: TONNAGE MOVED
Constant -4.92959
Std Err of Y Est 5.501058
R Squared 0.074650
No. of Observations 220
Degrees of Freedom 218
X Coefficient(s) 0.007307




YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
77 BULKER $4.60 26610 12 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $1.00 15633 17 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $8.90 22363 15 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $13.50 50900 1 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $8.60 26976 4 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $8.00 51299 8 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $2.20 19676 15 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $4.60 16765 8 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $3.30 15933 17 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $3.50 18162 6 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $6.25 25894 3 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $5.20 25531 10 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $6.00 26844 9 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $4.20 30593 9 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $2.50 16848 15 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $3.50 16992 8 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $3.15 25028 10 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $6.00 33151 5 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $5.45 24016 4 133 174.4 8.1 1515
77 BULKER $4.85 37238 9 133 174.4 8.1 1515
78 BULKER $2.80 49473 11 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $3.40 12198 3 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $3.50 46810 12 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $5.80 31775 3 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $3.60 51750 11 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $4.40 26000 3 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $2.00 49473 11 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $0.80 24410 17 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $13.20 60857 1 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $3.90 32312 7 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $1.70 16087 12 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $1.55 31786 15 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $0.94 52156 16 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $2.00 16272 10 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $6.00 92832 6 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $2.60 19536 10 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $4.60 137519 6 140 184.5 8.5 1602
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YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
-------------------------------------------------------
78 BULKER $1.20 16143 16 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $2.50 25379 12 140 184.5 8.5 1602
78 BULKER $2.40 38356 11 140 184.5 8.5 1602
79 BULKER $2.10 23115 18 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $1.35 16866 16 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $3.50 21479 11 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $8.00 38252 3 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $10.90 54681 5 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $8.90 65798 11 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $6.25 35855 9 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $3.05 18441 12 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $12.75 70818 3 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $6.30 25635 8 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $4.70 29492 14 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $3.30 16711 11 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $4.77 21516 8 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $10.50 61565 5 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $11.00 27947 3 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $8.20 29648 6 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $3.75 21134 11 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $4.00 21175 11 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $11.20 34583 7 179 188.5 8.9 1731
79 BULKER $10.50 29595 2 179 188.5 8.9 1731
80 BULKER $6.00 22135 11 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $6.30 38904 14 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $16.75 36071 2 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $20.30 60866 3 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $11.80 30910 6 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $5.50 23484 13 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $8.75 46545 13 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $15.50 36999 4 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $10.00 27500 3 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $8.50 25299 3 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $4.00 18009 15 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $11.90 27307 3 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $5.50 24564 15 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $12.50 38264 9 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $9.50 50789 13 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $16.50 69889 8 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $6.50 17002 6 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $18.00 66098 7 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $8.25 35040 12 213 191.0 9.3 1833
80 BULKER $5.40 26299 16 213 191.0 9.3 1833
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YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
--------------------------------------------------------
81 BULKER $8.60 19408 14 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $13.50 69613 13 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $7.60 28515 14 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $13.10 34575 9 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $19.00 34683 2 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $5.70 19876 11 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $4.50 29242 20 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $23.80 118440 8 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $5.60 36592 16 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $6.60 11110 5 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $9.20 80877 14 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $30.00 127050 5 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $9.50 25651 10 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $7.50 21916 8 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $9.20 80877 14 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $5.00 37468 15 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $7.50 36569 16 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $4.50 32168 18 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $11.00 53209 10 196 199.5 9.7 1866
81 BULKER $6.40 27484 13 196 199.5 9.7 1866
82 BULKER $4.55 77727 14 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $6.60 17715 5 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $4.50 100124 15 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $2.60 35751 17 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $11.00 27299 8 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $2.30 47561 16 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $1.50 39013 15 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $3.80 18634 12 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $6.45 51300 10 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $7.40 110342 11 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $7.75 26922 7 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $11.60 40524 6 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $1.20 15741 20 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $1.50 23973 13 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $2.00 55466 14 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $2.60 17351 12 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $4.90 26041 10 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $0.83 26299 10 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $3.00 17032 8 159 211.2 10.3 1793
82 BULKER $3.00 20446 13 159 211.2 10.3 1793
83 BULKER $3.60 22625 11 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $2.70 30643 11 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $1.60 37190 10 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $4.25 183570 11 170 220.6 10.5 1770
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SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
--- ------------------------------------------------------
83 BULKER $0.75 43812 16 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $2.10 108649 15 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $1.25 16876 18 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $7.20 71600 7 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $2.10 37088 16 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $4.95 26246 11 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $4.50 23222 10 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $7.60 26931 7 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $9.50 35164 6 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $1.70 15147 12 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $3.00 16895 11 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $3.90 54681 9 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $6.00 78138 10 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $1.15 38261 18 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $7.80 43112 7 170 220.6 10.5 1770
83 BULKER $1.20 30436 20 170 220.6 10.5 1770
84 BULKER $4.20 29902 9 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $1.25 31328 20 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $2.00 15917 12 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $4.50 34201 12 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $2.00 17351 14 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $13.25 118455 7 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $2.65 75436 16 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $6.00 29300 7 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $4.35 72789 13 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $8.50 122544 12 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $9.30 104850 10 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $0.92 19408 17 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $0.63 24378 20 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $10.50 63000 6 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $3.50 57580 16 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $0.60 16659 16 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $3.00 41261 14 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $2.50 74832 17 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $3.90 22670 7 173 228.6 10.5 1912
84 BULKER $5.35 61767 11 173 228.6 10.5 1912
85 BULKER $7.00 61398 11 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $2.43 76559 17 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $0.70 12000 15 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $2.95 27232 12 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $10.00 122750 9 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $2.30 26901 10 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $0.88 19672 15 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $2.75 22670 8 167 237.3 10.2 1923
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SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
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85 BULKER $1.15 9262 5 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.65 28420 14 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.20 12005 10 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $4.70 64473 7 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.25 51714 17 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.25 24353 14 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.75 29623 10 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.00 23222 12 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $6.50 37609 1 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $0.88 26646 14 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.60 30952 11 167 237.3 10.2 1923
85 BULKER $1.55 23151 8 167 237.3 10.2 1923
86 BULKER $2.50 52327 12 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $2.70 43112 9 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.39 28347 10 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $10.00 122050 11 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $3.00 87203 15 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $4.10 73172 9 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.20 26702 11 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $2.70 60920 11 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.90 37517 10 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $6.50 62343 4 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.75 35215 10 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $3.90 29192 2 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $0.88 26246 14 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.40 30797 12 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $3.10 165021 15 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $5.85 129882 10 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $0.90 26543 14 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $2.00 21310 5 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.90 21288 4 158 235.2 10.2 1945
86 BULKER $1.00 35308 14 158 235.2 10.2 1945
87 BULKER $4.50 169623 14 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $4.20 103332 16 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $7.50 64698 6 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $3.30 85414 15 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $5.70 69165 9 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $3.00 36254 10 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $3.50 34541 11 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $4.10 104749 15 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $1.30 47392 19 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $1.80 18750 8 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $1.25 20722 17 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $1.83 61473 16 174 231.8 10.4 1975
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-------------------------------------------------------
87 BULKER $7.50 217257 15 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $7.00 103729 13 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $3.25 55069 14 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $6.25 119696 15 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $4.45 26814 7 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $3.50 28003 13 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $7.30 145207 14 174 231.8 10.4 1975
87 BULKER $18.50 134806 5 174 231.8 10.4 1975
88 BULKER $4.00 26638 14 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $5.90 25854 7 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $5.10 16008 16 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $2.35 30781 18 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $8.00 119500 14 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $9.20 110906 15 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $7.90 145092 17 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $11.50 61523 12 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $16.20 127050 12 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $5.90 23960 8 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $4.00 21400 11 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $3.50 16866 11 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $3.10 25651 17 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $5.10 23584 14 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $7.00 53294 13 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $5.60 24738 11 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $2.40 19464 18 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $8.50 35343 10 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $8.10 37787 8 195 230.1 10.8
88 BULKER $4.80 23851 12 195 230.1 10.8
89 BULKER $12.00 84141 13
89 BULKER $8.10 37628 13
89 BULKER $4.00 16583 13
89 BULKER $17.00 169521 13
89 BULKER $2.70 27248 20
89 BULKER $2.50 16979 19
89 BULKER $3.60 25957 18
89 BULKER $8.50 61604 16
89 BULKER $14.00 167696 16
89 BULKER $2.40 16992 19
89 BULKER $12.50 24784 4
89 BULKER $16.30 61930 8
89 BULKER $8.00 25317 12
89 BULKER $6.50 26641 15
89 BULKER $14.80 36202 6
89 BULKER $5.50 29020 17
89 BULKER $14.00 64064 12
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89 BULKER $10.70 40404 13
89 BULKER $8.50 29300 12
89 BULKER $4.70 16641 17
77 CARGO $2.50 8002 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $2.20 8151 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $5.70 15188 5 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $2.15 8236 9 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.70 7435 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $2.80 9503 8 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $1.10 5008 15 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.95 7681 8 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $1.40 7688 17 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.70 15174 6 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $6.00 14969 9 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $6.00 14983 10 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.55 15832 9 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $5.00 15191 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $2.10 10637 6 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.65 16450 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $4.70 16117 8 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $3.50 15177 7 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $3.40 9906 10 133 139.1 13.7 1515
77 CARGO $1.60 10364 17 133 139.1 13.7 1515
78 CARGO $1.80 9754 17 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $2.30 12751 13 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $0.60 7183 15 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $5.50 14417 12 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.25 8538 17 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $0.81 12579 16 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.40 73365 13 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.28 10844 12 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.28 10804 12 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.25 6207 15 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $5.00 16350 6 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $3.00 12991 12 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.40 10910 13 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.40 10784 13 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $1.40 10827 13 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $0.65 9577 18 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $0.95 14738 17 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $2.38 6670 7 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $2.35 14299 11 140 146.8 13.8 1602
78 CARGO $2.35 14417 11 140 146.8 13.8 1602
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79 CARGO $1.40 10232 19 179 154.7 13-9 1731
79 CARGO $3.50 13005 10 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $3.25 8575 12 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $3.25 8575 12 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $1.22 12728 16 179 154.7 J 39 1731
79 CARGO $1.00 8923 16 179 154.7 I1.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.15 12753 12 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.15 12806 12 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.15 12841 12 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.95 15230 11 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $4.00 15138 6 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $1.56 15562 19 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $0.80 5260 17 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $3.20 15107 5 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.60 16245 10 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $3.30 16033 11 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $3.25 12139 9 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $2.20 14580 15 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $1.95 14689 16 179 154.7 13.9 1731
79 CARGO $1.30 12795 18 179 154.7 13.9 1731
80 CARGO $4.55 15103 9 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $1.17 15796 19 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $1.30 10320 19 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $2.00 6665 14 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $3.10 15542 13 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $8.50 16214 4 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $8.50 17128 4 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $3.90 15281 11 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $3.70 8903 4 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $2.50 9076 10 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $2.50 11607 13 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $4.75 16092 10 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $8.25 15060 2 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $8.25 15060 2 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $4.80 15103 9 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $3.85 12883 11 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $4.30 15418 11 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $7.20 20499 9 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $0.70 4196 13 213 160.1 14.0 1833
80 CARGO $0.50 4705 10 213 160.1 14.0 1833
81 CARGO $2.30 14519 20 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $5.75 15107 7 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $4.20 11612 6 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $7.90 15000 5 196 162.2 13.7 1866
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------------------------------------------------------------
81 CARGO $2.50 15783 20 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $3.30 9377 10 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $2.60 16230 20 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $2.70 15815 19 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $5.20 16261 10 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $3.90 26435 19 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $4.35 15154 13 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $2.10 11157 19 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $3.30 9937 19 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $3.30 9937 18 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $1.80 9094 18 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $1.10 14184 20 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $4.00 8299 6 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $4.00 8299 6 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $3.85 7849 9 196 162.2 13.7 1866
81 CARGO $4.70 11000 7 196 162.2 13.7 1866
82 CARGO $1.95 16816 18 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $2.40 23521 20 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $5.85 15166 9 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.60 12544 16 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $2.60 9857 10 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $2.00 12710 13 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.60 13733 15 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.10 12703 16 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $4.00 5525 5 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.50 17000 6 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $2.50 15022 14 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $2.50 13228 13 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $5.00 14899 6 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $5.00 14899 6 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $6.90 12466 4 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $0.75 14196 15 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $0.75 14196 15 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $0.80 12468 18 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.30 12102 13 159 165.6 14.2 1793
82 CARGO $1.15 13723 15 159 165.6 14.2 1793
83 CARGO $2.30 11723 8 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $2.30 11049 10 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.20 16382 15 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.30 3171 6 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.30 3171 6 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.75 16000 13 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $0.40 15838 20 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.55 6174 7 170 167.8 14.3 1770
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83 CARGO $1.10 13869 ii 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.60 10987 11 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $0.62 8288 13 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $4.20 14300 9 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $4.20 15099 8 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $3.90 31841 12 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $3.90 31841 12 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.00 11371 13 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $2.60 11897 7 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $7.50 15721 2 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $1.30 7476 10 170 167.8 14.3 1770
83 CARGO $8.50 22050 6 170 167.8 14.3 1770
84 CARGO $0.68 3377 13 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.50 11647 14 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $2.10 15139 13 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.30 12726 14 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $2.25 16008 12 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.70 11599 9 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $2.85 15460 11 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $4.90 18400 6 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $3.00 5385 5 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.60 15291 15 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $6.00 15120 5 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $6.00 15210 5 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $3.25 20950 8 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $3.25 20950 8 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $0.76 14466 16 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.00 7745 14 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.10 15094 14 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $0.80 11049 12 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $1.20 6200 8 173 168.1 14.2 1912
84 CARGO $2.50 13447 8 173 168.1 14.2 1912
85 CARGO $0.50 15480 16 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.00 19017 13 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.95 6081 6 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.85 5900 6 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.93 14992 12 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.40 15480 16 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.40 15480 16 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $2.75 15255 9 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $2.75 15255 8 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.95 11585 11 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.70 11603 14 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.50 18421 8 167 168.0 13.9 1923
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85 CARGO $1.30 9637 12 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.40 12281 13 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.40 17449 9 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.85 10077 11 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.50 19016 13 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.40 11679 9 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $0.43 15266 16 167 168.0 13.9 1923
85 CARGO $1.70 16213 9 167 168.0 13.9 1923
86 CARGO $0.51 15241 16 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.48 14924 17 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.80 17449 10 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.60 5210 7 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.80 15107 12 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $2.20 11300 11 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.00 15067 10 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.50 21103 12 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.29 8034 5 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.93 8161 4 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.33 15180 16 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.00 7654 13 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.00 7630 14 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.00 20949 10 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.43 5438 16 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $2.20 17152 8 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.70 16925 9 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.70 15251 12 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $0.75 15902 14 158 164.9 13.4 1945
86 CARGO $1.25 14841 9 158 164.9 13.4 1945
87 CARGO $2.40 22260 7 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $3.90 26987 5 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $0.94 16901 13 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $3.00 24270 10 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.90 14827 6 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.80 14566 10 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $4.80 21793 9 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $0.60 15139 15 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.35 15909 9 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.74 2811 9 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.10 14937 16 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.28 15259 12 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.20 15106 15 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $0.64 7112 14 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $0.68 7093 12 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $3.00 15767 9 174 163.5 13.8 1975
79
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
--- -------------------------------------------------------
87 CARGO $7.00 20441 7 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $1.20 10056 12 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $0.43 2689 17 174 163.5 13.8 1975
87 CARGO $2.10 16570 13 174 163.5 13.8 1975
88 CARGO $1.50 15174 17 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $1.65 16700 17 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $3.75 16120 11 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $1.70 1540 15 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $1.00 7435 17 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $3.50 15079 13 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $2.10 15057 15 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $2.70 17257 15 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $5.70 26568 11 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $3.70 20144 15 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $3.40 16901 14 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $2.70 7173 12 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $2.70 7114 6 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $4.20 15166 15 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $4.30 20335 11 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $4.05 15163 11 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $1.80 16030 18 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $8.50 17800 10 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $4.05 15196 11 195 161.9 14.0
88 CARGO $3.00 16055 14 195 161.9 14.0
89 CARGO $2.10 7875 16
89 CARGO $3.80 16270 16
89 CARGO $10.50 21031 12
89 CARGO $6.50 16291 13
89 CARGO $6.50 19205 13
89 CARGO $1.80 7554 19
89 CARGO $5.00 16570 14
89 CARGO $4.00 14900 13
89 CARGO $4.00 14900 13
89 CARGO $5.80 15767 11
89 CARGO $9.00 20850 10
89 CARGO $3.90 11757 12
89 CARGO $3.00 8001 16
89 CARGO $9.00 26568 12
89 CARGO $2.30 15139 18
89 CARGO $2.50 16158 20
89 CARGO $8.60 7954 9
89 CARGO $5.70 16582 12
89 CARGO $3.20 11589 14
89 CARGO $1.70 15153 17
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
77 TANKER $5.00 75675 12 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $1.20 61074 13 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $8.00 210257 9 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $5.20 195119 9 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $9.30 72346 4 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $40.00 499933 1 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $14.00 86899 2 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $14.00 86899 2 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $6.00 98912 8 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $9.80 140450 5 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $3.25 96981 10 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $17.40 272491 4 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $10.80 216675 7 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $3.20 103929 13 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $10.00 209407 8 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $3.00 44901 14 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $3.40 75675 12 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $12.50 140778 3 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $5.50 93735 10 72 335.3 9.1 1898
77 TANKER $1.00 70801 12 72 335.3 9.1 1898
78 TANKER $5.00 18785 4 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $0.85 53207 15 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $9.60 249261 5 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $7.75 80000 3 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $2.60 82462 13 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $11.50 138373 4 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $13.30 32240 2 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $22.00 372217 3 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $2.05 110241 10 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $14.10 40200 2 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $2.05 110241 10 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $0.60 20913 17 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $0.80 21215 18 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $7.50 232979 5 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $3.25 61471 15 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $1.50 21469 16 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $4.25 231912 9 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $6.00 133559 8 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TANKER $25.50 362118 3 97 339.1 9.5 1949
78 TLNKER $0.55 16117 18 97 339.1 9.5 1949
79 TANKER $4.50 209407 10 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $3.15 62212 15 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $14.00 140999 5 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $1.30 13816 18 89 338.3 9.9 2038
81
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
79 TANKER $0.80 20457 18 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $3.20 20457 18 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $13.50 140999 5 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $15.50 38414 10 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $15.50 38414 10 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $2.20 70211 6 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $16.00 32395 2 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $3.75 55394 15 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $8.00 220050 9 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $15.00 40200 3 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $5.00 181879 10 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $13.15 32737 9 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $13.15 32737 8 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $13.15 32737 6 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $7.50 111302 12 89 338.3 9.9 2038
79 TANKER $4.25 96842 15 89 338.3 9.9 2038
80 TANKER $20.00 92134 5 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $15.00 32531 7 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $15.00 32531 7 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $9.20 23674 13 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $29.00 132207 1 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $7.00 63172 15 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $7.30 95529 15 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $27.00 224336 7 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $21.00 139340 6 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $7.80 11788 10 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $4.50 53280 18 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $15.00 28574 4 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $18.50 96550 4 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $12.50 133559 10 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $16.50 29087 5 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $16.00 60091 7 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $9.00 218813 9 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $13.00 79078 6 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $6.80 100588 12 71 339.8 10.4 1871
80 TANKER $6.30 75560 14 71 339.8 10.4 1871
81 TANKER $6.90 217616 11 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $6.50 75850 14 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $7.30 102092 13 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $10.00 260158 7 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $3.50 51929 18 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $3.20 80351 16 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $3.10 70861 15 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $4.25 139528 13 47 335.5 10.6 1693
82
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
--------------------------------------------------------
81 TANKER $18.50 87813 6 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $12.25 278219 6 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $5.00 14428 14 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $6.85 16071 7 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $10.35 257059 9 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $3.00 99308 15 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $2.40 59195 17 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $4.15 219014 11 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $3.75 259471 11 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $1.90 77541 16 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $2.50 46459 18 47 335.5 10.6 1693
81 TANKER $4.60 24821 12 47 335.5 10.6 1693
82 TANKER $8.00 117710 10 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $13.50 250874 7 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $1.73 63147 18 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $1.73 59032 18 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $3.25 219998 15 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $3.50 258603 11 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $1.30 49631 17 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $4.20 144148 7 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $3.50 131813 10 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $12.90 89940 6 43 325.2 11.1 148082 TANKER $3.80 239604 9 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $4.70 139137 9 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $2.80 263383 5 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $7.00 126997 7 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $2.50 222375 11 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $1.50 67594 17 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $19.20 132250 6 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $3.80 60301 9 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $7.50 224850 11 43 325.2 11.1 1480
82 TANKER $17.00 82253 0 43 325.2 11.1 1480
83 TANKER $1.10 220300 13 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $6.10 36266 7 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $3.70 240827 8 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $1.60 20977 18 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $3.60 240827 7 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $2.80 137160 9 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $4.15 277108 9 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $3.60 117909 11 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $5.55 343423 5 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $4.00 14496 9 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $2.70 34622 17 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $3.50 137160 8 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
83 TANKER $4.10 269195 6 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $4.00 318754 8 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $6.30 127002 8 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $7.60 26909 9 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $10.00 145649 8 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $5.60 269709 9 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $1.55 64805 20 46 306.1 10.3 1461
83 TANKER $3.50 227604 12 46 306.1 10.3 1461
84 TANKER $14.00 54999 9 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $10.00 232750 8 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $5.00 236807 10 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $6.00 32737 13 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $5.00 221597 2 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $5.60 236807 10 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $5.50 318754 9 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $6.00 392543 8 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $4.30 97886 13 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $1.70 50904 20 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $7.50 83986 10 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $3.60 21321 15 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $9.00 140905 10 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $15.00 491120 6 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $5.60 323114 8 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $3.50 36402 11 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $8.50 32046 10 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $3.71 30294 12 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $2.65 56685 18 48 286.8 10.7 1498
84 TANKER $6.50 229945 8 48 286.8 10.7 1498
85 TANKER $7.50 232369 11 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $0.70 25067 17 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $4.00 133725 14 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $3.50 150761 14 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $6.50 31600 10 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $1.65 71152 19 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $2.00 50995 20 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $15.00 39723 1 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $15.00 39723 2 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $10.20 39750 3 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $2.75 32212 10 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $5.50 421681 9 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $5.60 388119 9 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $4.20 83258 11 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $4.20 83365 12 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $5.80 64487 5 41 268.4 11.3 1459
84
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
85 TANKER $4.25 90995 9 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $3.65 89702 10 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $6.00 31650 6 41 268.4 11.3 1459
85 TANKER $8.75 81561 5 41 268.4 11.3 1459
86 TANKER $5.10 392798 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $6.75 372201 12 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $4.00 77102 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $4.15 83466 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $6.50 323092 7 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $5.10 392798 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $7.00 155505 9 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $6.50 232164 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $4.60 87801 11 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $2.60 102913 16 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $10.60 85992 5 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $9.60 290762 12 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $1.80 25001 8 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $2.60 21104 17 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $7.20 60951 12 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $3.08 22610 15 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $4.00 112627 17 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $2.50 101997 19 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $2.50 101977 18 50 247.5 11.9 1533
86 TANKER $15.20 357023 9 50 247.5 11.9 1533
87 TANKER $11.40 61335 6 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $9.75 138930 11 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $9.00 134372 12 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $1.05 4168 18 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $4.00 31120 13 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $1.85 19813 20 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $4.10 30243 18 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $6.50 40200 11 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $10.25 81283 7 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $8.50 59250 10 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $9.70 62381 12 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $9.00 38851 19 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $6.00 215925 16 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $9.66 124264 13 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $4.60 9064 4 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $4.20 97176 15 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $12.00 39258 7 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $6.40 269195 10 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $16.20 319226 11 62 245.5 12.2 1530
87 TANKER $4.50 104447 19 62 245.5 12.2 1530
85
YR SHIP PRICE DWT AGE AVG TOTAL AVG TRADE
SOLD TYPE MILLIONS AT FGHT FLEET AGE VOLUME
SALE RATE SIZE MIL.TON
88 TANKER $9.80 227401 17 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $14.25 87301 8 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $14.00 87355 8 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $7.20 138291 16 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $2.70 7057 13 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $14.50 239726 12 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $11.00 258282 16 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $6.10 29687 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $16.80 300078 11 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $12.00 173847 12 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $20.50 89943 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $7.50 32755 13 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $16.10 84464 7 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $5.40 35621 13 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $5.40 35621 13 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $9.70 81296 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $12.50 128303 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $5.60 21214 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $12.60 125882 14 68 245.0 12.4
88 TANKER $15.10 38629 7 68 245.0 12.4
89 TANKER $15.10 123699 14
89 TANKER $10.50 39105 13
89 TANKER $15.30 140743 14
89 TANKER $8.00 32214 14
89 TANKER $17.90 63797 8
89 TANKER $8.00 32116 14
89 TANKER $15.00 25200 15
89 TANKER $13.30 66726 10
89 TANKER $13.30 66726 10
89 TANKER $9.50 5948"7 13
89 TANKER $8.50 82030 20
89 TANKER $20.00 81279 8
89 TANKER $21.00 130257 14
89 TANKER $13.00 26328 7
89 TANKER $13.00 26328 7
89 TANKER $10.50 25300 15
89 TANKER $10.50 25200 15
89 TANKER $26.50 86966 8
89 TANKER $25.50 54131 8
89 TANKER $28.50 81279 6
86
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